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THE ED SPACE COMPETENCE AS PER THE TREATY OF LISBON:
SEA CHANGE OR EMPTY SHELL?
Frans G. von der Dunk
University of Nebraska, College of Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program
Fvonderdunk2@unl.edu

Abstract
The entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon late 2009 introduced a so-called
'space competence' of the European
Union into the already complicated
legal European 'spacescape' . It has
been hailed by some as a sea change, a
watershed following which the EU
finally and irreversibly has entered the
realm of legislating for space, whereas
others fail to see it as more than an
empty shell, a fig leaf for politicians to
be able to show at least some progress
towards a united European approach
and policy with respect to space.
Whilst some discussion has focused on
whether this 'shared competence', a
specific term of art in EU law, would
not better be qualified as a sui generis
'parallel competence', no notable
attention has been paid to the more
fundamental question to what extent
the inclusion of the relevant clause in
the Treaty of Lisbon has resulted in a
real change as to the legislative and
regulatory side of space activities
undertaken in the European context.
The present paper will therefore try to
analyse in somewhat more detail what
the real significance of this new 'space
competence', is, might or will be. This
analysis will be undertaken with
reference not only to the terminology
of the Treaty of Lisbon and a related
clause of the preceding but aborted
Constitutional Treaty, but also with
reference to the previous legislative
efforts of the European Union relevant
to space, the few national space
legislations of EU member states, and
the role of ESA in this context.

1. The discussion on the EU space
competence
The Treaty of Lisbon I entered into
force on 1 December 2009, following a
decade-long effort to adapt the EU
governance
structure
to
new
developments, notably including its
expansion to 27 member states.
Amongst its many innovative clauses
there were a few which amounted to
giving the Union what has been
labelled a 'space competence'. Thus,
"[i]n
the
areas
of
research,
technological development and space,
the Union shall have competence to
carry out activities, in particular to
define and implement programmes;
however, the exercise of that
competence shall not result in Member
States being prevented from exercising
theirs"?
This clause was part of the Article
providing for the scope of shared
competence between the Union and its
member states, but the last part of the
clause quoted has led some to conclude
that this was not so much a shared
competence
but
a
"parallel
competence,,3, as individual member
states would retain sovereign discretion
as such to draft and implement their
own national policies and legislation in
this area. More specifically,
"I. To promote scientific and
technical
progress,
industrial
competitiveness,
and
the
implementation of its policies, the
Union shall draw up a European
space policy. To this end, it may
promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
development, and coordinate the
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efforts needed for the exploration
and exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the
objectives referred to in paragraph
I, the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure,
shall establish the necessary
measures, which may take the
form of a European space program,
excluding any harmonization of
the laws and regulations of the
Member States.
3. The Union shall establish any
appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency.
4. This Article shall be without
prejudice to the other provisions of
this Title.',4

2. The 'prehistory' of the European
space competence

Various commentators hailed these
provisions as a sea change, the Union
now finally having been given a full
legislative role regarding the European
space effort, as opposed to merely (co-)
financing and supporting it. Others
have pointed out that an earlier version
of the clauses had been considerably
more
far-reaching;
from
this
perspective this particular version was a
bit of a disappointment - if not indeed
an empty shell. The present paper
presents an effort to evaluate and
appraise the true value of these
provisions as lying somewhere between
those two' extremes'.
However, before such a proper
evaluation and appraisal is possible, it
is important to understand the
background leading up to this Treaty,
this particular competence clause and
this extended discussion. Thus, firstly,
the 'prehistory' leading up to the
discussion on a European space
competence will be briefly outlined
before, secondly, the short 'history' of
the evolvement of the relevant clauses
will
be
scrutinised
from
that
perspective - in order to then assess the
clauses at issue as to their true merit:
sea change or empty shell?
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In the whole discussion on a European
space competence often the suggestion
is made that before the failed
Constitutional Treatl and the more
successful Treaty of Lisbon were on the
table there was no such thing as a
competence of the Union and its key
organs - from this perspective the
Commission, the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament - to
legislate on space. But was there really
no 'space competence' at the EU level
prior to the discussions regarding those
(draft) treaties?
Perhaps it all depends on how one
defines 'space competence'. Obviously,
outer space not being part of any (EU
member) state's territory,6 it could also
not 'geographically' form part of the
EU realm. However, already long
before
the
discussions
on
a
Constitutional Treaty had started in
earnest in the early 2000's, the
European Community, then Union had
exercised jurisdiction regarding outer
space activities in four distinct areas
albeit in somewhat indirect
'accidental' fashion.
Firstly, in 1986 the Single European
Ace added Articles 130f through 130q
to the EEC Treatl, whereby the EC
institutions were charged with building
and
financing
research
and
development framework programmes
endowed with large funds, and develop
other, partly legislative instruments to
enhance research and development.
References
to
research
and
development were widely accepted to
include space as a relevant area
showing great potential for more down~
to-earth technological, then also
economic and societal spin-offs. 9 Thus,
the European Community also started
building
relationships
with
the
European Space Agency (ESA)lo, the

0;

prime European organisation involved
in space research and related activities.
Secondly,
following
rapid
developments
in
the
satellite
communications sector In the late
1980's
and
early
1990's
the
Commission was quick to move into
this most practical, most commercial
and by any standards largest field of
space applications. After a 1990 Green
Paper ll had applied the calls for
liberalisation and privatisation in the
general telecom sector by means of an
earlier Green Paper l2 to this specific
subsector, in 1994 the first piece of EU
law resulted: the Satellite Directive J3 .
The Satellite Directive provided the
framework for implementation of
Internal Market principles into the
satellite
communications
sector
throughout the Union, for example
imposing such principles as separation
of regulatory and operational functions,
the prohibition of concerted anticompetitive
practices
and
the
prohibition of abuse of dominant and
monopoly positions in that market.
Many Directives and Regulations
followed elaborating that regime, in
addition to Decisions on perceived
market-distorting practices by satellite
communication service providers. 14
Also, the privatisation of the three
major international satellite operators
INTELSAT,
INMARSAT
and
EUTELSAT was partially the result of
these legislative developments. ls
Whilst in many respects the Internal
Market for satellite communications
has yet to be finalised, through such an
adoption of Directives, Regulations and
Decisions the EU institutions have
exercised
a
large
measure
of
jurisdictional competence in this major
area of the human space endeavour.
Not technically speaking in space
perhaps, but certainly with respect to,
and having a great impact upon,
relevant activities in outer space.

Thirdly, when in the 1990's space
remote sensing came to be of interest
also for commercial applications, a
legal instrument to protect the
investments in remote sensing was
found wanting. The existing intellectual
property rights protection regimes were
not very appropriate or effective, and
the Commission then lead an effort to
develop such a legal tool, making
certain that space-derived data would
explicitly be encompassed in, and
appropriately dealt with in the context
of, the broader concept of databases
which were in the end given special sui
generis protection by Directive 96/9. 16
Again, perhaps not amounting to
jurisdiction in or over outer space, but
certainly co-determinant with respect to
the potential for the relevant category
of activities in outer space to be
successfully undertaken.
Fourthly, as the major role certain
space applications could play in
developing European economies and
societies became clear, the Union also
started to become a 'space player' in its
own right. In 1994 it had already taken
the policy decision to become involved
in what was known as the Global
Navigation Satellite System; 17 an idea
which soon evolved into Europe (with
the Union leading and ESA following)
building its own full-fledged system
Galileo. By 2002 the Union was ready
to enunciate its first proper piece of EU
law on the issue, a Regulation setting
up a Galileo Joint Undertaking,18
followed in 2004, 2008 and 20 I0 by
19
·
more key Regu IatlOns.
EU interests in practical applications of
space soon led to another 'European
space flagship'
being developed
together with ESA; the Global
Monitoring for the Environment and
Security (GMES). The primary political
decision was announced in 2001 2 °;
meanwhile, also the first piece of EU
legislation on GMES has been
384

enunciated - in 2010 21 . It remains to be
seen of course, to what extent the
Union is effectively now abdicating its
leading position in this respect, with
GMES very recently being relegated
back to the member states as far as
crucial funding was concerned. 22
Still, the increasing cooperation with
ESA in the context of these two
flagship projects (and the prospects of
more flagship projects on the horizon)
also gave rise to the Framework
Agreement with ESA in 2003. 23 This
represented a treaty-like document
between two international organisations
of which one (ESA) still undoubtedly
qualified as an intergovernmental
organisation, whereas the other (the
Union) was a sui generis halfway house
between such an organisation and a
supranational construct. In any event,
apparently the EU institutions had now
obtained a level of treaty-making
powers with regard to space and space
activities, coupled to a general (co-)
leading role in the relevant policy area.
As pointed out, it partly depends on
one's definition of 'space competence',
but if that term is taken to refer to
competences to legislate, adjudicate
and enforce with respect to space
activities in any meaningful sense, the
above initiatives of the Union in the
context of space research and
development, space communications,
space remote sensing and space
navigation should qualify. It is thus
clear that even before the Constitutional
Treaty came about, the EU institutions
had somehow obtained and exercised
such competences to draft EU
legislation and adjudicate and enforce it
in several areas of space activities.
From that perspective therefore, the
question as to the real novelty of the
new clauses of the Treaty of Lisbon
remains principally valid: what sort or
level of 'space competence' is actually
added by the latter?
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3. The 'history' of the space
competence
The proper history of the space
competence started in the early 2000s,
where the ambitious exercise to draft a
Constitutional Treaty presented a
vehicle for those contemplating true
integration of the European space
efforts.
Historically, ESA had taken care of
such efforts by presenting a solid yet
flexible framework for international
cooperation. The 'solid' part was
represented in particular by the
'mandatory programmes', the scientific
and
research
and
development
programmes to which all states had to
contribute at a predetermined scale?4
The 't1exible' part was represented in
particular
by
the
'optional
programmes', which usually involved
actual launches and satellite operations
- and allowed member states to opt out
of a programme altogether (and then
not contribute to it) or determine their
scale of contributions at a different
level from that applied as a baseline
option
essentially the
same
predetermined scale as for the
mandatory programmes. 25
Since the ESA Director-General could
also himself propose European space
programmes,26 ESA was often seen as
not merely a platform for member
states to integrate their national space
policies, but also as itself developing a
European space policy - even as with
regard to any such proposals it was still
the member states which had to agree
by two-thirds majority before they
would be implemented??
To the extent that the totality of ESA's
programmes thus agreed upon and
executed could be deemed to constitute
a proper 'space policy', however, it
certainly was not one that the
proponents of EU competence in space
considered
particularly
coherent,

logical and/or helpful. The ingrained
inability of ESA to overcome key
individual
member
state
policy
divergences,
the
'geographical
distribution' principle as main focus of
the 'industrial policy' 'of ESA,28 and
the principled absence of competence
for ESA to regulate any activities
within the European 'spacescape' in
any legal sense of the word all
conspired to point at the timeliness of
handing over the lead in the European
space effort to the Union.
There had been earlier efforts on the
part of the European Union to take a
more active, even leading role in
defining European space policies. For
example, in 1993 a Space Advisory
Group had been established to
institutionalise
cooperation
and
coordination between ESA and the
Commission in matters of outer space. 29
In 2000, a European Space Strategy
was developed as part of a first joint
meeting of the ESA Council and the
EU Council of Ministers (the two
highest organs of the organisations 30)
which spelled out the perceived
respective roles of the two - with the
Union leading all efforts which should
allow Europe to reap the benefits from
space activities for society and markets,
as opposed to scientific and research
and development oriented policies
programmes, and projects. 3! By 2003,
the Commission had effectively taken
the steering wheel, when it produced on its own - its White Paper "Space: a
new European frontier for an expanding
Union
An action plan for
implementing the European Space
policy".32 The call was expressly made
for, inter alia, space infrastructures and
applications to serve the needs of EU
political objectives and to update the
institutional structure to provide the
Union with new powers to drive, fund
and coordinate activities within this
enlarged Space Policy.33

The ambitious effort to arrive at a
Constitutional Treaty, which tried to
move the process of European
integration considerably forward on
many fields and issues, now seemed the
perfect carrier for fully taking over the
reins on the European space effort.
And indeed the Constitutional Treaty
provided for the clauses which, once
the Treaty itself came to fail and a
much dressed-down follow-on drafting
exercise resulted in the Treaty of
Lisbon, survived that failure and were
included in the latter.
There was one major exception
however: Article 189(2) of the Lisbon
Treaty as quoted above, had essentially
copied
Article
1II-254
of the
Constitutional Treaty with respect to
the EU competence henceforth to
"establish ( ... ) necessary measures,
which may take the form of a European
space program" - but had crucially
added the phrase "excluding any
harmonization of the laws and
regulations of the Member States".
If the 'space competence' under the
Treaty of Lisbon is indeed not to be an
empty shell, the key question clearly is:
what 'necessary measures', including
development of a 'European space
program' could the EU authorities thus
take when these could not result in
harmonization of laws and regulations
of EU member states?

4. The EU space competence: sea
change or empty shell?
Thus finally returning to the question
of what the Treaty of Lisbon actually
added to the existing opportunities of
the EU institutions to fundamentally
and in a legal (or at least para-legal)
sense
impact
the
European
'spacescape', the key clauses of Article
189 should be seen to essentially

386

contain no less than four, closely
intertwined concepts.

4.1. A European space policyFirstly, paragraph 1 provides that "[t]o
promote scientific and technical
progress, industrial competitiveness,
and the implementation of its policies,
the Union shall draw up a European
space policy".
Of course, '(European) space policy' is
not a legal term in the strict sense of
the word. 'Space policy' refers to a
slightly abstract and largely strategic
formulation of overarching goals and
objects, which may at some point be
given shape by specific law or
regulation - but are equally often given
shape by non-legal, essentially political
and policy instruments. This is also
true of the 'European space policy'
referenced in some key preceding EU
documents as cited above.
Nevertheless, it often does constitute
the point of departure for specific
legislative and regulatory initiatives. In
particular in the EU context, where the
principles
of 'subsidiarity'
and
'proportionality,34
require
careful
of any
EU-Ievel
legitimisation
legislative action as compared to
leaving it for the individual member
states to regulate, the recognition of an
EU
'competence'
to draft an
overarching space policy can be seen
as the first recognition that any further
legislative initiatives, firstly, at the EU
level should not be dismissed off-hand
and secondly, as far as still possible at
the individual member state level,
should essentially fit within the broad
framework of such a policy.
4.2. European joint initiatives.
Secondly, paragraph 1 also provides
that the Union for the purpose of the
aforementioned space policy "may
promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
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development, and coordinate the
efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space".
Indeed,
such
programmes
and
activities would logically form part of
a 'space policy'; actually are
manifestations thereof at a more
concrete and less overarching level,
thus reinforcing the conclusion that by
obtaining the 'competence' to draft (a)
European space policy, the EU
institutions have actually prepared the
ground for truly legislative initiatives,
rather than as such taking them. That is
essentially policy, not law - yet hugely
important for the legal realm.
With a view to 'subsidiarity' and
'proportionality', the legitimacy of the
Union promoting - including, most
notably, by means of its budget - such
joint
initiatives,
research
and
development, and general coordinating
activities now no longer depends upon
a specific market-related need or
requirement, but would in principle be
broadly accepted across the spectrum
of space activities and applications.

4.3. European space programmes and
other necessarv measures.
Thirdly, the above 'competence' to
promote joint initiatives, research and
development, and general coordinating
activities may still refer to fairly
unspecific instruments to implement
any space policy, but in addition now
paragraph 2 provides that for that same
purpose the EU institutions may also
"establish the necessary measures,
which may take the form of a
European space program".
[t may be noted here that the
relationship between a 'space policy',
as an overarching set of goals and
objectives and the specific 'space
programmes' and projects as the
practical manifestation of that policy,
has also led many authors to discuss
the role of ESA in development of a

European space policy. Many civil
space programmes in Europe (certainly
the more visible and sizeable ones),
following the dichotomy of mandatory
and optional programmes under the
ESA Convention, are ESA, that is
European, space programmes - in
other words: are deemed to somehow
constitute a European space policy.
However, this equation overlooks that
often space programmes arise not
(necessarily) as a consequence of some
overarching space policy, but as
individual, quite autonomous answers
to specific societal interests - or even,
more simply and cynically, specific
industrial or economic interests.
The reference in the Treaty of Lisbon
to space programmes developed by the
Union in the context of a space policy
and supported, as necessary, by
specific legal measures is by contrast
considerably more coherent, and due to
the reference in the same sentence to
"the ordinary legislative procedure"
clearly points to major space
programmes (of which Galileo and
GMES were already examples) as
accompanied by the necessary legal
framework, or even to legal measures
considered desirable or necessary,
properly taking 'subsidiarity' and
'proportionality' into due account.
By way of those clauses therefore,
effectively the competence of the EU
institutions to draft a European space
policy to those extents has now been
more or less silently acknowledged, in
particular to the extent such a policy
would tie in with the general remit of
the EU institutions to further the
economic and societal development of
the member states within an ever more
coherent Union 35 • Thus, from this
perspective the competence of the
Union to now (also) develop and
implement
European
space
programmes as per the Treaty of
Lisbon is an extension of the 'politico-

programmatic' competences of the EU
institutions as relative to those of EU
member state authorities - but not of a
very revolutionary nature, as Galileo
and GMES most clearly show. The
recent events concerning GMES,
moreover, may put into serious doubt
whether that acceptance may not be
equally 'silently' be allowed to slip
away dropped (even if only for downto-earth budgetary reasons).
Whatever one's evaluation of this,
however, that still did not amount to a
legal competence properly speaking that
is,
indeed,
where
the
Constitutional Treaty presented a
novelty, as essentially copied in this
particular part of paragraph 2 of
Article 189 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Henceforth, the competence that the
EU institutions with respect to space
would henceforth have, would no
longer be completely dependent on
sector-specific characteristics related to
commercial markets and require
application of the free market and
competition
principles
relatively
narrowly focused on a free and level
playing field for commercial enterprise
throughout the Union - as had
happened, most elaborately, in the
satellite communications sector. There,
indeed the Commission essentially had
set about harmonising market access,
state aid and licensing issues all in as
far as distorting the Internal Market,
only now and then inserting clauses
protecting wider public interests such
as public or universal services.
Had the Constitutional Treaty been
accepted, the Commission would have
had for the first time the competence to
address 'space' and 'space activities"
in their full measure, not only as
commercial activities but also as a new
area where scientific, commercial,
societal and strategic interests would
all have to be accommodated by more
fundamental legislation and regulation.
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This brings analysis to the last element,
where the Treaty of Lisbon added to or rather detracted from
the
Constitutional Treaty's approach.
4.4. No harmonisation ot'nationallaw.
So what then does the additional, for
many
disappointing
clause
of
paragraph 2, mean, when it conditions
the competence by "excluding any
harmonization of the laws and
regulations of the Member States"?
Differently from other areas, where
following
'subsidiarity'
and
'proportionality' individual member
states would no longer be entitled to
draft their own legislation to the extent
those
competences
had
been
transferred to the EU level and such
transfer would ipso facto allow the EU
institutions to guarantee a harmonised
regime, if necessary by harmonising
existing national regimes, here such
harmonisation is not possible.
What this means from the other end is
ultimately related to the extent in
which (the) member states have
already elaborated relevant domestic
law on an issue of space activities.
One prominent example thereof
concerns private space activities, and
the licensing thereof. So far, six EU
member states have established a
national space law providing in any
appreciable detail for a licensing
system including for example liability
and
insurance
obligations
for
licensees. 36 It follows, that this now
excludes a competence for the Union
to try to harmonise those licensing,
liability and insurance requirements.
On the other hand, currently one
specific new branch of private space
activities seems about to be taking off
- commercial manned spaceflight, also
often (somewhat imprecisely) labelled
'space tourism'. In the absence of any
specific reference, let alone adaptation
to this sub-sector of private space
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activities, one could validly pose the
question whether in this specific
respect there is any domestic law of
substance which would bar Union
legislative activity in this area.
4.5. Sea change or empty shell?
As for example the last question above
cannot yet be answered with definitive
authority, whether the EU 'space
competence' as resulting from the
Treaty of Lisbon represents a sea
change or an empty shell would also
remain an open question as of yet.
Here, 'the proof of the pudding' may
well be 'in the eating' indeed. In other
words, will the EU authorities for
example feel comfortable in addressing
commercial manned spaceflight from
an EU-perspective by way of
legislation in view of the above - and if
they undertake an effort, will they be
stopped in their tracks by member
states referring to the above clauses?
At present, therefore, the most that can
be said is that the 'space competence'
currently looks more like a shell than a
sea change; a shell, however, which
could become incrementally filled (and
itself increase in the process) through
the constant appropriate interaction
between EU institutions and EU
member states within the framework of
'subsidiarity' and 'proportionality'.

Endnotes
Treaty of Lisbon amending the
Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European
Community (Treaty of Lisbon),
Lisbon, done 13 December 2007,
entered into force 1 December 2009;
OJ C 306/1 (2007).
Art. 4(3), Treaty establishing the
European Community as amended by

2.

the Treaty of Lisbon amending the
Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European
Community (Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union), Lisbon, done
13 December 2007, entered into force
1 December 2009; OJ C 115/47
(2009).
So e.g. S. Hobe, et ai, A New
Chapter for Europe in Space, 54
Zeitschrifi fur Lufi- und Weltraumrecht
(2005),346-7.
3.

Article 189, Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.

4

5. Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe, Rome, done 29 October 2004,
not entered into force; OJ C 310/1
(2004).
6. See Art. II, Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),
London/Moscow/Washington, done 27
January 1967, entered into force 10
October 1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS
6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No.
10; Cmnd. 3198; 6 lLM 386 (1967).

Single
European
Act,
Luxembourg/The Hague, done 17/28
February 1986, entered into force 1
July 1987; 25 ILM 506 (1986); OJ L
169/ I (1987).
Treaty of Rome, or Treaty
establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC Treaty), Rome, done
25 March 1957, entered into force I
January 1958; 298 UNTS 11.
Cf. e.g. Toksvig Report on European
space activities, Doc. B 2 565/86, of 6
July 1986.

9.

10. See also The Community and Space
- A Coherent Approach, Commission
Report, COM(88) 417 final, of 26 July
1988. For an excellent recent account
of EU involvement in European space
activities, see further I. Marboe,
National Space Legislation: The
European Perspective, in Nationales
Weltraumrecht - National Space Law
(2008), 31-46.
ESA had been established in 1975 by
means of the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Space
Agency (ESA Convention), Paris, done
30 May 1975, entered into force 30
October 1980; 14 ILM 864 (1975);
Space Law - Basic Legal Documents,
C.l.l.
II. Towards Europe-wide systems and
services - Green Paper on a common
approach in the field of satellite
communications in the European
Community, Communication from the
Commission, COM(90) 490 final, of
20 November 1990.

12. Towards a Dynamic
European
Economy - Green Paper on the
Development of the Common Market
for Telecommunications Services and
Equipment, Communication from the
Commission, COM(87) 290 final, of
30 June 1987; OJ C 257/1(1987); as
per Council Resolution on the
development of the common market
for telecommunications services and
equipment up to 1992, of 30 June
1988, OJ C 257/1 (1988).
13. Commission Directive amending
Directive 88/30l/EEC and Directive
90/388/EEC in particular with regard
to satellite communications (Satellite
Directive), 94/46/EC, of 13 October
1994; OJ L 268/15 (1994).

390

14
Some early examples of such
legislation are: Commission Directive
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the abolition of the
restrictions on the use of cable
television networks for the provision of
already liberalized telecommunications
services, 95/51/EC, of 18 October
1995;
OJ
L
256/49
(1995);
Commission
Directive
amending
Directive 90/387/EEC with regard to
personal and mobile communications,
96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; OJ L
20/59 (1996); Commission Directive
amending Directive 90/388/EEC with
regard to the implementation of full
competition in telecommunications
markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996;
OJ L 74/13 (1996); and Decision of the
European Parliament and of the
Council on a coordinated authorization
approach in the field of satellite
personal communications systems in
the Community, No. 710/97/EC, of 24
March 1997; OJ L 105/4 (1997).
Some early examples of decisions
enforcing competition policy in the area
are: Commission Decision declaring a
concentration to be incompatible with
the
common
market
and
the
functioning of the EEA Agreement
(IV/M.490
Nordic
Satellite
Distribution), No. 96/177/EC, of 19
July 1995; OJ L 53/20 (1996);
Commission Decision relating to a
proceeding under Article 85 of the EC
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA
Agreement (IV/35.518 - Iridium), No.
97/39/EC, of 18 December 1996; OJ L
16/87 (1997);
and Commission
Decision declaring a concentration to
be compatible with the common
market and the EEA Agreement
(COMP/M.4403
Thales/
Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space &
Telespazio), of 4 April 2007; OJ C
034/5 (2009).

391

15. Cf. e.g. Art. 3, Satellite Directive, in
conjunction with the other articles of
the Directive and the 1990 Green
Paper
effectively
calling
for
abolishment of the various anticompetitive elements in the legal
structures of these three organisations.
16
Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the
legal protection of databases, 96/9/EC,
of 11 March 1996; OJ L 77/20 (1996).

17. Council Resolution on the European
Contribution to the Development of a
Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS), of 19 December 1994; OJ C
379/2 (1994).
18. Council Regulation setting up the
Galileo
Joint
Undertaking,
No.
876/2002/EC, of 21 May 2002; OJ L
138/1 (2002).
19. Those concern Council Regulation
on the establishment of structures for
the management of the European
satellite radio-navigation programmes,
No. I32112004/EC, of 12 July 2004;
OJ L 246/1 (2004); Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the
Council on the further implementation
of the European satellite navigation
programmes (EGNOS and Galileo),
No. 683/2008/EC, of9 July 2008; OJ L
196/1 (2008); and Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the
Council setting up the European GNSS
Agency, repealing Council Regulation
(EC)
No
132112004
on
the
establishment of structures for the
management of the European satellite
radio navigation programmes and
amending
Regulation
(EC)
No 683/2008
of
the
European
Parliament and of the Council,
No.912/201O/EU, of 22 September
2010; OJ L 276/11 (2010).

Council Resolution on the launch of
the initial period of global monitoring
for environment and security (GMES),
of 13 November 2001; OJ C 350/4
(200 I).
20.

Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the
European Earth monitoring programme
(GMES) and its initial operations
(2011 to 2013), No. 91 1/20 I OIEU, of
22 September 2010; OJ L 276/1
(2010).
21

22

See

e.g.

b11J2:lL\Y'I:Y}\',-,<;j2ill:q1f\Y~Q9ml civiII I I 01

19-ec-wants-nations-fund-gmes.html.
Framework Agreement Between the
European
Community
and
the
European Space Agency (Framework
Agreement),
Brussels,
done
25
November 2003, entered into force 28
May 2004; OJ L 261/64 (2004); 53
ZLW 89 (2004).

navigation
services
GalileoDefinition phase, of 19 July 1999; OJ
C 221/0 I (1999).
30. Cf. Art. Xl, ESA Convention, resp.
Art. 16, Treaty on European Union as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon
amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, Lisbon, done
13 December 2007, entered into force
I December 2009; OJ C 115/1 (2009).
31

See Council Resolution on
developing a coherent European space
strategy, of 2 December 1999; OJ C
375/1 (1999); and Council Resolution
on a European space strategy, of 16
November 2000; OJ C 371/2 (2000).

23.

24. See Art. V(1 )(a), ESA Convention.
The contributions of the various
member states were based on the
respective Gross National Products; cf.
Art. XIII( 1).

See Art. V(l)(b), ESA Convention,
in conjunction with Art. XIII(2).

White Paper - Space: a new
European frontier for an expanding
Union
An action plan for
implementing the European Space
policy, COM(2003) 673 final, of II
November 2003; emphasis added.
32.

See esp. §§ 2, 3, White Paper Space: a new European frontier for an
expanding Union.
33.

See Art. 5, Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.

34

25.

26

See
Art.
Convention.

Xll(1)(b),

27. Cf. Art. XI(5)(a) &
Convention.

ESA

(c), ESA

28. See Art. VII & (in particular) Artt.
II, IV, V, Annex V, ESA Convention.

Cf. e.g. Preamble, § (5), Council
Resolution on the involvement of
Europe in a new generation of satellite

29.

Cf. Preamble, 9th consideration,
Treaty on European Union.
35.

36. This concerns, in chronological
order, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and
Austria; see e.g. I. Marboe & F.
Hafner, Brief Overview over National
Authorization
Mechanisms
in
Implementation
of
the
UN
International Space Treaties, in F.G.
von der Dunk (Ed.), National Space
Legislation in Europe (2011), 29-73.

392

